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Abstract
Due to limited rainfall and uneven spatial and temporal distribution of water resources, 
water has become a restraining factor in agriculture and livestock production of China 
and Tanzania. As it is most considered as common-pool resource, the management of 
water resources is a complex issue in agricultural and pastoral industry. Traditional 
water management modes include nationalization and marketization, but complete mar-
ket-oriented or government management could not reach the sustainable use of water 
resource due to nonexclusive and interconnected features of water. Therefore, China and 
Tanzania introduced water resources community self-management in rural arid areas. 
Farmers as resource users in community conducted mutual supervision and mutual ben-
efit to realize reasonable, fair, and sustainable use of water resources. However, commu-
nity self-management is restricted by formal institution from the government of China, 
and Tanzania’s community self-management relies on the financial and technical support 
from foreign NGOs; the communities’ ability to obtain benefit needed to be improved. 
We compare water resources community self-management mode in China and Tanzania 
through case studies, put forward the differences of self-management mode in two 
countries, and analyze the characteristics of successful water resources community self-
management mode.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Water resources in arid regions in China and Africa
Water is the basis for the survival and sustainable development of the human society. With 
the development of the society and economy, the water crisis caused by the lack of water 
resources and water pollution has become one of the key factors restricting the economic and 
social development. Nowadays, arid and semiarid regions in the world account for about 
40% of the total land area, while the freshwater resources on the earth only account for 1.6% 
of the water resources on the earth’s surface. About 40% of the global population in more 
than 80 countries is facing serious water crisis [1]. With the trend of global warming, the area 
of arid and semiarid regions will accelerate its expansion, which is expected to account for 
more than 50% of the global land surface by the end of the twenty-first century. In addition, 
three-quarters of the arid and semiarid region expansion will occur in developing countries, 
exposing developing countries to the risk of further land degradation and aggravating the 
poverty of people in arid and semiarid regions [2]. The United Nations Water Conference 
pointed out that the next crisis after the oil crisis is the water crisis [3].
The inland arid zone of Northwest China is located at the north of the 35°N and the west of 
106°E, including Xinjiang, the Hexi Corridor in Gansu province, and Inner Mongolia region, 
west of Helan mountain, accounts for about 24.5% of the total land area of China [4]. The 
northwest arid region consists of mountains and basins. Rivers originate from the mountain 
area flows to the basin. The distribution of water resources determines that the surface runoff 
and groundwater resources of the area are the key factors and ties to maintain the economic 
development and ecological environment balance of the middle and lower reaches. The cli-
matic conditions of inland drainage area show a significantly difference, with precipitation 
ranging from 300–1000 mm in the alpine region to 100–200 mm in the plain region, and sea-
sonal variation was obvious. Precipitation is mostly concentrates from June to August, and 
drought was common in winter and spring (Figure 1 [5]). Under the constraints of water 
resources distribution and climatic condition, the inland river valley ecological environment 
system usually forms the argo-pastoral transitional zone with pastoralism and irrigated agri-
culture, which is the fragile ecological environment zone. With the increase of population, 
the development of social economy, and the exploitation and utilization of soil and water 
resources, a series of hydrological and ecological environment changes have been occurred. 
As a result of the drought caused by the reduction of water resources, grassland reclama-
tion, and overgrazing, the grassland area in river valley is reduced and seriously degraded. 
Grassland degradation caused the decline and disappearance of some dominant herbage spe-
cies and thus the decline of biodiversity [6]. From 1958 to 2005, the forage yield in Northwest 
China decreased by 75.4% [7].
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), drought area accounts for 20% of land but accounts for over 80% 
of the affected population [8]. Much of the continent is dependent on rain-fed agriculture, 
which makes it particularly susceptible to climate variability. Almost 70% of the labor force 
is engaged in agricultural work, and agriculture contributes to about 25% of average gross 
domestic product (GDP) across the continent [9]. The limited water resources have direct 
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impacts on agriculture and livestock grazing over large space and time scales. The impacts are 
driven by the high vulnerability of the natural environment and are exacerbated by prevail-
ing local and external economic and political conditions [10], which can be associated with 
development of famine and may be accompanied by the spread of disease. The population 
of SSA is over 870 million people and is expected to at least double by the mid-twenty-first 
century. Coupled with expected overall drying with climate change, in particular in Southern 
Africa and parts of West Africa [11–13], there are worrisome implications for water resources 
sustainability use and food security.
Water resources in SSA is linked to the high seasonal and inter annual variability in rainfall 
(Figure 2 [14]). In general, seasonal rainfall higher than 500 mm is required to sustain healthy 
agriculture, highlighting the tenuous nature of agro-pastoral livelihoods in the transitional 
regions between semiarid and arid regions in some parts of SSA. In northern Tanzania, 
the rainy season is generally from November to April, and well-defined dry season is in 
July–September.
The shortage and the imbalance of spatial and temporal distribution of water resources have 
become the bottleneck of economic growth and social development in arid regions. With the 
increase of population and the expansion of industrial and agricultural production and urban-
ization, the residents in arid regions have an increasing demand for water resources. Many 
ways have been taken to expand the scale of water resources development. While obtaining 
Figure 1. Seasonal mean precipitation (1950–2008) in Xinjiang, China, for (a) December–February, (b) March–May, 
(c) June–August, and (d) September–November.
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temporary economic benefits, it has caused serious negative impacts on the ecological envi-
ronment. Understanding the ecological environment and the farmers’ livelihood needs and 
changes in arid regions; managing limited water resources scientifically and rationally devel-
oping the maximum economic, social, and ecological benefits of scarce water resources; and 
ensuring the sustainable use of water resources have always been the key concerns of the arid 
region research.
1.2. Management of water resources in arid regions
Water resources management can be divided into government regulation, water rights trad-
ing market, and community self-organization management according to the different distri-
bution modes of water resources property rights.
Figure 2. Seasonal mean precipitation (1950–2008) in Africa for (a) December–February, (b) March–May, (c) June–August, 
and (d) September–November.
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Due to the mobility, recycling, and public characteristics of water resources, most national 
laws stipulate that the ownership of water resources belongs to the state, and the state has 
the right of allocation and final decision-making of water resources. In fact, the ownership, 
management, and use of water resources are separate. The ownership of water resources in 
China belongs to the government, the use of water resources by industries and agriculture 
should be under administrative permission, and the water use license cannot be traded on 
the market [15]. The government allocates limited water amount by administrative means, 
and researchers explore various methods to optimize water allocation, in order to maximize 
the economic, social, and environmental benefits. However, due to the conflict of interests 
among the water use stakeholders, it is impossible to achieve the optimal allocation of water 
resources in practice. At the same time, the regulation of water price fails to reflect water 
value, and this rationing system eventually leads to the general expansion of demand, further 
exacerbating the contradictions between the stakeholders and increasing the difficulty and 
confusion of management.
On the other hand, developed countries usually adopt the method of establishing water 
resources trading market. Based on the clear definition and initial use right of distribution 
of the water resources, the use right of water resources exchanges among regions, basins, 
upstream and downstream, industries, and households through market mechanism. Under 
the law of value, water price and water resources value could be adjusted and matched, and 
the distorted situation that water resources are priceless or low could be changed. According 
to the development of the market economy, economic leverage is used to regulate water prices, 
and the government only carries out macro supervision in this process [16]. However, as 
water is an irreplaceable vital resource, complete marketization will also face many problems 
according to water resources characteristics, such as the definition of initial water resources 
allocation mode and water users’ short-sighted behaviors driven by interests, which will 
cause the failure of water resources market.
Besides government and market, Ostrom proposed the third option in “Governing the 
Commons,” namely the self-organization and management of common-pool resources [17]. 
Based on the analysis of several classic models including Hardin’s “The Tragedy of Commons” 
and “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and Olson’s “The Logic of Collective Action,” the conflict between 
individual rationality and collective rationality was drawn. According to Ostrom, the defects 
of traditional game analysis methods and the theoretical assumptions they rely on were devi-
ated from the real situation, such as rational person assumption, complete information access, 
independent action, noncommunication, and first-order game. Ostrom took small-scale com-
mon-pool resources as an example and demonstrated that a group of limited rational person 
communicated and interacted with each other in the process of sharing natural resources. 
They could obtain more information on resources and other actors’ behavior and develop 
effective common-pool resources use contract through self-raised funds. Ostrom analyzed 
the possibility of community self-management theoretically. In Ostrom’s theory, although 
limited rational actor did not have complete information, they could increase their under-
standing of other actors through communication in the process of the game, fully understand 
each person’s influence on common-pool resources, and then change their own strategies to 
obtain more benefits.
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In Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), collective action of 
resources needed to solve three problems, such as the problem of supply of the current insti-
tution, the problem of credible commitment, and the problem of mutual monitoring. As for 
the supply of the institution, Ostrom believed that cooperation balance should be generated 
through multiple games among community members based on current institution, in order to 
form a series of mutual beneficial situation and an informal system of community mutual trust. 
As for credible commitment, Ostrom argued that self-management groups should develop 
effective regulations and take appropriate supervision and sanction measures to ensure that 
community members follow the rules. As for mutual monitoring, Ostrom believed that after 
the establishment of regulations and the commitment to follow the rules, the implementation 
of the regulation and the allocation and use of common-pool resources in accordance with 
regulation should be monitored.
Therefore, we compared two typical cases of water resources community self-management 
in China and Tanzania; described the details of the cases from the supply, credible commit-
ment, and mutual monitoring aspects; analyzed the internal difference between China case 
and Tanzania case; and thus put forward effective community self-management mode that 
has a positive impact on natural resources and the livelihood of farmers.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Study area
2.1.1. China
Xinjiang’s Yili valley agro-pastoral zone is stratified by elevation, transitioning from low-
altitude semiarid agriculture at elevations below 1000 m to humid alpine meadow pastoral-
ism at elevations above 1000 m. The annual precipitation below 1000 m is 400–500 mm [18]. 
With relatively abundant snowmelt from the Tian Shan mountains, the valley’s lowlands and 
riparian corridors provide a significant share of Xinjiang’s irrigated agriculture, whereas the 
middle and upper regions of the mountains are humid alpine meadow grassland that has 
been used for extensive livestock grazing (mainly sheep but also cows, goats, horses, and 
some camels) for a thousand years.
M village is located on the western slope of the Tian Shan mountains in the headwaters of the 
Yili River, in the Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. Pastoralism and agriculture coexist, and the 
former plays a dominant role. There were 558 households with 2273 people, of which 50% were 
Kazakhs (village statistics). Natural pasture area is about 9333 ha. Farmland area is about 504 ha.
2.1.2. Tanzania
The study was conducted in Hai district specifically at Saaki spring as a case study. In the 
recent years, there has been a tendency of cutting trees around the Mountain Kilimanjaro on 
the side of Hai district which impact in the shortage of water around the district causing seri-
ous problem at Saaki spring and Hai district as a whole. Hai district which is situated in the 
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Northern part of Tanzania is among the six districts forming Kilimanjaro Region. The district 
is subdivided into three divisions which are Lyamungo, Machame, and Masama. The district 
has 14 wards, 60 villages, and 11 urban streets. Saaki spring is the biggest source of water 
which serves people who live in Hai town where the district headquarters is situated and is 
also serving people who live in the villages. Generally, the Saaki spring is approximated to 
serve the population of more than 58,003 people who live in the villages and streets.
S village is located in the middle of the district, which belongs to Masama division. The list of 
water user households was gathered in village registers. Most of the villagers participated in 
agriculture production. The population of the village was 3793 in 532 households.
2.2. Data and methods
The study used a qualitative approach to describe the current status of water resources 
community self-management in China and Tanzania case. As supplementary, quantitative 
approaches help to measure data from the field work study. The two approaches comple-
mented each other in gathering data to create valuable information for understanding com-
munity participation in water resources management.
Primary data on community participation in water resources management were collected 
from the respondents. Field research was completed using semi-structured interviews with 
households in 2015. Interviewees were selected by purposive and simple random sampling. 
Eighty-three households in M village (China) and 80 households in S village (Tanzania) were 
interviewed, more than 15% of the total household number in two villages. The purposive 
sampling technique was used to select the key informants from the village level who were 
knowledgeable and responsible for developmental issues and water resources management 
in their respective areas of work. Simple random sampling technique was used to select house-
holds in the study area to represent the specific and detailed information. Interviews focus on 
water use and management in agriculture and livestock production and the perceptions and 
opinions of interviewees on environmental and social changes. Additional interviews of local 
government officials, water engineers, and NGO technicians provided overall information.
3. Results
3.1. Institution supply: use rights of water resources
3.1.1. China
In the late 1970s, as China transitioned from a planned economy to a market economy, the 
Household Land Contract System (HLCS) was implemented. The land was contracted to 
individual households while formally remaining the collective ownership. According to the 
HLCS, all agricultural outputs are owned by the household except for the state agricultural 
tax (which was canceled in 2006). Land use privatization greatly increased labor produc-
tivity and rural economic development and thus helped numerous farmers climb out of 
poverty (Lin, 1994).
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However, water resources have the integral characteristics. The law claims that water 
resources are owned by the state. The Chinese government has many departments involved 
in water resources management, but there is no independent and complete water resources 
management center, which lacks unified and coordinated management at the government 
level. Compared with industrial water use, agricultural irrigation water is generally dispersed, 
random, and low marketable. It is difficult to establish a standard water resources trading 
market, and under the premise of state-owned water resources, it is also difficult for farmers 
to obtain the independent water resources use rights and to be water resources traders. On the 
other hand, since ancient times, the nomadic Kazak people lived in tribes, shared information 
with their relatives, and helped each other in agricultural and pastoral production, providing 
a good cultural foundation for the community self-management model.
3.1.2. Tanzania
The land in Tanzania belongs to private landowners, and landowners were entitled to spring 
water on their land. Before African independence, the state played a negligible role in the 
allocation of water rights and the development of water resources [17]. After 1964 (Republic 
of Tanzania foundation), the water use rights were controlled and regulated by the state, but 
landowners still had the right to use public water in public streams.
The right of private owners to use water in rural areas which had its source on the land or 
flowed over the land was a direct consequence of their landownership. Although there was 
no finality over the ownership of water, the use of water was derived from and linked to the 
ownership of land.
China and Tanzania all experienced land use privatization. However, the water property has 
always been rather vague. Water resources was owned by village collective in China, but 
owned by landowners in Tanzania. China’s government has much more authority in water 
management than Tanzania. However, water use rights need to be distributed to private 
household in practice. No matter in China or Tanzania, community is the actual main body of 
the water resources use.
3.2. Credible commitment: water use regulation establishment
3.2.1. China
In M village, rain-fed farmlands and livestock drink water use were mostly from river and 
precipitation, which did not relate to the allocation of water resources. The water resources 
community self-management was mainly reflected in the irrigation of irrigated farmland 
through water canal.
The Household Land Contract System was introduced in 1984, according to the privatization 
use of farmland, the sorted by position and used in turn allocation way of water resources for 
each household was formed. Due to the unstable water volume of the canal, farmers did not 
pay the irrigation water fee at first, and the water resources management was quite chaotic. The 
upstream households of the canal might use more water, and downstream households had no 
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enough water. Or, the imperfect rotation management mechanism led to missed watering of 
some households. Now, under the guidance of the village government, M village had gradu-
ally formed a mode of community self-management of water resources allocation. First of all, a 
water manager was elected on the villager meetings at the beginning of each year, and the farm-
ers in village acted as water manager in turn. The water manager was responsible for collecting 
water fees and managing the canals, resolving farmers’ water use disputes, and prohibiting 
water theft. The salary of water manager is 10% of the water fee. The water supply of the canal 
was from June to September. The water fee increased from 24.05 dollar/ha in 1984 to 72.14 dol-
lar/ha in 2015. Each household paid 50% of the water bill in June and another 50% in September. 
Besides the salary of the water manager, the remaining 90% of the water fee is paid to the village 
cooperation for the reinforcement and seepage prevention of the canal. Households who paid 
water fee took turns to irrigate their farmlands from upstream to downstream, the diameter of 
irrigation pipes was fixed, and each household could irrigate for a maximum of 48 hours, after 
which irrigation water was rotated to the next household (Figure 3).
Figure 3. The canal diagram of M village.
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3.2.2. Tanzania
Water resources community self-management was implemented in Tanzania by UBWS (Uroki-
Bomang’ombe Water Supply). They sent technicians, made guidebook and gathered villagers’ 
representatives to discuss the baseline environmental conditions, mapped and interpreted 
water resources present situation, analyzed resource user and stakeholder, and developed the 
action, monitoring, and evaluation plan. However, when the farmers were asked whether they 
knew who was responsible for the management of Saaki spring, 55% of the farmers had the idea 
that the one who is responsible for Saaki spring management is the water authority and district 
government, and only 12.5% had the view that it was managed by the community-based group.
More than 50% of the farmers claimed that they were not involved in the planning activities, 
but they were involved in planting trees, cleaning the water source, and securing the water 
source. No more than 10% of the farmers involved in and participating in water regulation 
discussion meetings. This shows that the community has not been adequately involved in the 
spring management meetings, which indicates the need to seriously address it.
Fifty-five percent of the farmers disagreed on the statement that Saaki spring was managed 
through information sharing. There is much to be done to improve the information sharing 
of community in the management of the spring. What is more is that some of the community 
members even did not understand the existing regulations governing the spring. About 30% 
of the farmers were aware that cutting trees nearby the source of water, farming around the 
water source, trespassing, feeding animals, dumping poisonous wastes, and washing clothes 
were prohibited by the laws.
3.3. Mutual monitoring performance: farmers’ perception and water use efficiency
3.3.1. China
As for community self-management, after the establishment of the water resources use regula-
tions, the effective supervision and punishment mechanism were particularly important. Eighty 
percent of farmers in M village believed that the existing irrigation water allocation and rotation 
system in village are effective in improving the water use efficiency. However, there is still a gap 
with the optimal efficiency, which is caused by the imperfect management system and serious 
waste of water. In particular, although the water manager was elected by all the villagers, he/
she was also belonged to farmer households in the village. When irrigating his own farmland or 
the farmland of his relatives, his supervision might be ineffective and unfair. On the other hand, 
when the water disputes between villagers occurred, water manager had no absolute authority 
to judge the problem as national judicial departments and also had no right to enforce house-
holds who caused the problem to compensate for damage. The water manager was just a media-
tor, persuaded both sides to put down the disputation and carry out a harmonious solution. 
Most of the time, the disputation still destroyed social mutual trust between farmer households.
3.3.2. Tanzania
From the interview, majority (81.2%) of households were not satisfied with the management 
of Saaki spring, while only 18.8% were satisfied. The majority (63.9%) of people claimed that 
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they were not satisfied because they were not involved in decision-making. Moreover, 9.2% 
of the farmers commented that plans of managing the spring were not well implemented and 
the cost of connecting water was too high. In general, farmers held the view that there was 
poor community management of the spring water. They asserted that they want to get more 
involved in meetings and planning in the future.
The big challenge which faced community participation was limited involvement in the 
management of the spring. Other challenges included difficulty to protect the spring, poor 
supervision of water source, the cutting down of trees for firewood, and cleaning the spring.
4. Discussion
From the analysis of two cases of water resources self-management in China and Tanzania, 
the different property rights system of water resources in China and Africa leads to the dif-
ferent impeller of community self-management, and the final results are also different. The 
impeller of China is the village government, while the impeller of Tanzania is NGO. To form 
an effective water resources community self-management mode in arid regions, the following 
points need to be noted:
1. Full participation of the community member contributes to the rational allocation of water 
resources.
In Tanzania, the large community was not given the chance to participate at various 
stages like planning, implementation, and evaluation. Only few, especially village lead-
ers, claimed to participate in all stages. However, every villager participated in electing a 
water use supervisor and agreed with the water rotational use regulation in China. People 
needed to be involved from the earliest stage to the upper one during the self-management 
procedure. Water resources managed without the participation of the community in deci-
sion-making, planning, implementation, and evaluation are often not properly maintained 
and hence lack sustainability (NAWAPO, 2002).
When carrying out community self-management, the majority of the farmers should be 
involved in participatory meetings, participatory planning, protecting the water source, 
supervising the water sources, and training on water source preservation. It is the respon-
sibility of the local government to make sure that the large community is involved in the 
whole process. It will lead to community participation, pollution control and information 
sharing, and hence the sustainability of water resources.
2. Effective information sharing is conducive to the water resources use regulation.
Information dissemination was very crucial for the community in order to promote com-
munity participation in the process of water self-management. Adequate information shar-
ing leads to optimal goal achievement and relationship building; hence, the effective and 
efficient dissemination of accurate information to the public is essential. Informing and 
educating those who participate in community projects could make them permanently 
able to defend their own interests (Abrahamsson, 1977). Thus, participation supports the 
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integration of interests through an intensive exchange of information among concerned 
actors and lays the foundation for cooperation and establishment of the sense of owner-
ship for the sustainability of the water resources.
The local government could provide important technology guideline, database, experi-
ence, and ideas that could lead to practical, relevant, achievable, and acceptable commu-
nity self-management solutions.
3. The combination of formal and informal institutions is conducive to the effective mutual 
monitoring.
Community self-management mainly relies on community informal management sys-
tem. On this basis, appropriate intervention of formal systems may be helpful to water 
resources management. Formal institutions could ensure community members follow 
the rules and punish those who violate the rules more effectively. For example, the 
supervision and punishment in the water resources use regulations can be raised to the 
formal level. There are laws to be followed in the performance of the water manage-
ment regulations, and an independent monitoring organization for villagers can be set 
up to strengthen the intensity of supervision, punishment, and mediation. On the basis 
of the complete participation of all members, communication, and information sharing 
mechanism, the involvement of the formal system can avoid the negative influence of the 
farmers’ social relations on the mutual supervision performance within the community 
under the informal system.
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